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Abstract
The quantity regulation of license plates for small 
passenger cars is a typical public policy of government 
intervention in transportation market. The goal of the 
policy is to control the number of vehicles in a region, 
with the main purpose of controlling the growth rate 
of small passenger cars and reduce traffic congestion. 
This paper takes Beijing as an example to analyze the 
implementation effect and welfare effect of the vehicle 
quantity regulation. The analysis results show that the 
policy implementation is different from Singapore. It 
can control the rapid growth of small passenger cars in a 
city from a macro perspective, but it cannot control the 
growth of vehicles on the road for a city, so it is limited 
to reduce traffic congestion. On the other hand, the policy 
of controlling the number of small passenger cars will 
bring a series of welfare losses. In this regard, this paper 
puts forward suggestions of improving policy design, 
increasing supporting policy measures, strengthening 
urban public transport construction and changing 
residents’ travel mode to enhance the implementation 
effect of the policy.
Key words: Vehicle quota system; Regulation by 
quantities; Policy implementation effect; Welfare effects
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INTRODUCTION
As China’s economy and society continues to develop 
rapidly, demand for passenger cars is vigorous, and small 
passenger car holdings continue to be a fast growing 
trend. In 2015, the total number of private small passenger 
cars exceeds 124 million, with 31 cars per hundred 
households. New car registration of up to 23.85 million, 
has a net gain of 17.81 million cars, which are the highest 
level in history. The traffic trip structure has changed 
radically. For example, the ratio of cars in motor vehicle 
has been increased rapidly, the ratio in recent five years 
has increased from 47.06%to 61.82%, and the mass 
motorized trip mode has undergone the transformation 
from motorcycle to car. There are 40 cities with more 
than one million cars per city in China. And 11 cities’ 
car holdings are lager than 2 million. they are Beijing, 
chengdu, shenzhen, Shanghai, chongqing, tianjin, suzhou, 
zhengzhou, hangzhou, guangzhou and xi ‘an. Urban road 
congestion has become one of the important issues in our 
city’s urban development. In this regard, local government 
departments issued relevant control policies, such as lines 
of control policies, vehicle quantity regulation and so 
on. Among them, the vehicle quantity regulation policy 
is more controversial. The policy of “vehicle quantity 
regulation” is aimed at the control of small passenger cars 
with 9 persons or less. Through the control of the number 
of plates issued, the policy can limit the rapid growth of 
the annual vehicle population.At present, seven cities in 
China implement the vehicle quantity regulaiton policy 
for small passenger cars, namely Shanghai, Beijing, 
Guiyang, Guangzhou, Tianjin, Hangzhou and Shenzhen. 
These cities determine a certain amount of license plate 
issuance per year for small passenger cars, and distribute 
the license plate through a specific mechanism. There are 
mainly three issuance modes: lottery mode, auction mode 
and lottery-auction mixed mode.
Actually, China is not the first. In the early 1990s, 
some countries have adopted the quantity regulation 
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policy of small passenger cars to deal with the problem of 
road congestion, most typical of which is urban Singapore. 
This has also attracted some scholars who study public 
policy. Their research on the quantity regulaiton of small 
passenger cars mainly focuses on three aspects: policy 
effect, efficiency and welfare comparison. In terms of 
policy effects, there are mainly positive and negative 
effects. The positive effect on society is relatively simple. 
Anthony (1996) proved that the control regulation on the 
number of small passenger cars mitigated the growth rate 
of small passenger cars in the short term, and Seik(1998) 
showed that the number of small passenger cars was 
effectively arrested. But the policy has had a negative 
impact through other channels. Phang (1993) argues that 
Singapore’s policy of controlling the number of small 
passenger cars promotes rent-seeking and speculation. 
Chu and Goh (1997) argued that the policy increased 
the license price of small passenger car, because the 
economic impact and limited supply of license as well as 
the intervention of automobile distributors would affect 
consumers’ auction strategy and price. Koh (2003) studied 
the impact of the vehicle quantity regulation policy on 
the market structure of the auto distribution industry 
in Singapore, and found that the market concentration 
degree of distributors with high market share increased 
steadily, and the oligopoly monopolistic operation pattern 
of different goods appeared. Seik (1998) argued that 
Singapore’s “vehicle quota” system raised the total price 
of buying cars and reduced residents’ access to small 
passenger cars. At the same time, CHU s. (2015) further 
studies pointed out that the high cost of car purchase 
actually increases the frequency of people using passenger 
cars.
In terms of efficiency and welfare comparison, some 
researches mainly compare the welfare and efficiency 
of price regulation and quantity regulation. According to 
Smith (1997), under imperfect information, the demand 
curve is uncertain. If the real demand is greater than the 
predicted demand, the welfare loss of price regulation is 
greater than the welfare loss of quantity regulation, that 
is, quantity regulation is more efficient. By constructing 
demand function for small passenger cars, Chu s. (2012) 
used the data under different quantity regulation modes in 
Singapore from 1991 to 1998 and from 2002 to 2011, and 
concluded that open auction and diversified license plate 
issuance are relatively efficient. Muthukrishnan (2010) 
analyzed from the perspective of welfare economics and 
concluded that compared with the quantity regulation 
policy of small passenger cars, the social welfare of 
imposing taxation (such as road charge, congestion 
charge) is much lower. So the existing quantity regulation 
policy was better. In the efficiency study mentioned 
above, when the welfare losses of quantity regulation and 
price regulation are compared and analyzed, there is no 
discussion on the different slope of the cost curve and the 
demand curve of small passenger cars, and data support is 
also lacked, which will eventually lead to the difference of 
welfare loss comparison and lack of certain rigor.
There have been a lot of discussion on the issue of the 
quantity regulation of small passenger cars in some major 
cities in China. There are two types of opinions. Firstly , 
they support the quantity rugulation policy.Rao xuyong 
(2011) argues that as far as the current situation of Beijing 
is concerned, the lottery is better than the congestion 
fee, road construction, traffic restriction and auction 
policies. This phenomenon also appeared in S.CHU 
(2015) ‘s analysis of Singapore brand control policy. That 
is to say, auction increases the cost of car purchase and 
encourages customers to use cars more than before, which 
makes congestion even worse. Xuan changyong (2013) 
believes that lottery and auction are not the mechanism 
to maximize social welfare, but lottery are preferable and 
sub-optimal than auction. The auction makes the road right 
more inclined to the rich and lacks fairness. However, 
there are two major problems of lottery: the low bid rate 
and the phenomenon of abandoning the mark. Second, 
some scholars hold negative attitude to quantity regulation 
policy. For example, from the perspective of law, Jie-jun 
Yang (2013), Liu Fangliang (2014), Chen Junfeng (2015) 
all agree that the vehicle quantity regulation policies and 
procedures are unfair. It violated the constitution,property 
law ,other state laws, private property rights and deprived 
the rights of people to buy car, also restrict sellers’ right 
of legitimate business. On the other hand, from the 
perspective of economic efficiency and fairness, Fan 
liangcong (2015) believed that the quantity regulation of 
small passenger cars would affect the decision-making 
of market subjects, distort the allocation of resources and 
reduce the allocation efficiency. He suggested that the 
right of way should be stripped from license plates and 
the right of way auction market should be constructed. 
Sun rong et al. (2014) pointed out that there is inequality 
in “lottery”, and the existing policy will lead to invalid 
resource allocation, which will have a negative impact on 
the economy. In the welfare analysis, it is not clear which 
aspects are included in the welfare loss. In the effect 
analysis, the effect analysis of congestion control is not 
studied.
1.  CASE: IMPLEMENTATION EFFECT 
OF VEHICLE QUANTITY REGULATION 
POLICY 
1.1  The Vehicle Quota System in Beijing 
In 2010, Beijing promulgated the “interim regulation of 
small passenger cars quantity”, which made corresponding 
provisions on the vehicle purchase quota, regulation 
methods and regulation subjects. Details are as follow.
(a) the car registration for a total number is 240000 in 
2011, 20000 a month on average. The individual quota 
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share was 88 percent. Operating small passenger car quota 
accounts for 2 percent; Institute and others quota account 
for 10 percent.
(b) the vehicle registration qualification needs to 
obtain through the lottery once a month. The process 
is to apply for lottery qualification code, and obtain 
the lottery opportunity after being qualified. The quota 
administration conducts a lottery on the 26th of every 
month. The individual or organization who obtain the 
registration qualification should complete the registration 
within 6 months.
(c) there are three types of people could have the 
lottery qualification. local residents and the residents who 
hold the city’s work and residence permit, as well as those 
who have paid tax in Beijing for more than 5 years and 
have the certificate of tax payment.
During the implementation of the policy, the number 
of residents participating in the lottery far exceeded 
the quota, and the rate of winning the lottery was 
getting lower and lower. In 2013, the Beijing Municipal 
Government revised the “interim regulation on the 
quantity control of small passenger cars”. As of 2016, 
the major changes in the lottery mechanism mainly 
include the following three aspects: The first is to set 
the ladder winning rate, that is, the winning rate of the 
participants with different number of shaking numbers 
is different. Applicants who participated in the lottery 6 
times were the first step, and the winning rate was the 
benchmark winning rate. Each time you participate in the 
6th advanced level, the winning rate is the corresponding 
multiple of the benchmark winning rate. The second is to 
cancel the new indicators for the official vehicles of the 
organs and institutions. Third, in terms of quota allocation, 
the ratio of new energy vehicle indicators is close to the 
ordinary indicators, and the new energy vehicle indicators 
can be directly obtained.
1.2  Quantity Regulation Effect
Since the implementation of the quantity regulation 
policy in Beijing, it has been implemented for nearly 
8 years. In order to analyze the effect of the quantity 
regulation of small passenger car licenses in Beijing, we 
use the counterfactual analysis method for analysis. We 
use the actual data before the implementation to predict 
the number of passenger cars under the assumption that 
the policy is not implemented. Specifically, this paper 
conducts a gradual multivariate linear regression of 
Beijing traffic data when the 1989-2009 policy is not 
implemented, and obtains a passenger car demand model. 
Then we use this model to predict the quantity of Beijing’s 
passenger car in the six years of 2010-2016. The number 
of passenger cars is compared with the actual amount of 
car possession.
In the variable selection, we select the annual private 
car ownership increment as the explanatory variable, 
indicated by G_NUM. Because of the policy setting of 
the number control of small passenger cars in Beijing, the 
main limitation is the number of private passenger cars, 
and the annual increments are controlled. Simultaneously 
selecting the increment of the quantity as the explanatory 
variable can avoid the autocorrelation problem of the 
interpreted variable. The explanatory variables are mainly 
factors affecting the increment of small passenger cars, 
respectively, disposable income (indicated by PICOM), 
population increment (indicated by G_POP), fuel price 
index (indicated by DI), road construction (using ROAD) 
and so on.
Table 1
Regression Results of the Incremental Demand Model 
of Private Small Car Ownership
(1) (2)
G_NUM G_NUM
PICOM 0.0016*** 0.0018***
(0.000) (0.000)
G_POP -0.0398
(0.136)
DI 0.0191
(0.847)
ROAD -0.0011
(0.508)
_cons -3.7773* -2.8889
(0.015) (0.815)
N 20 19
R2 0.915 0.929
F 193.7409 45.5563
P-value in parentheses,p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Source: Beijing Basic Database of Macroeconomic and Social 
Development http://43.254.24.2/ww/MenuItemAction!queryMenu
Then we use the regression model above to predict 
the number of private passenger car ownership under 
unlicensed conditions in 2010-2016. The final results are 
shown in Figure 1 below.
According to the forecast data, the actual and 
forecasted holdings of private passenger cars in Beijing 
from 2010 to 2016 are both on the rise. However the 
actual holdings are lower than the forecasted holdings, 
and the gap is gradually widening. As of 2016, the number 
of private passenger cars in Beijing remained below 5 
million. In 2010, there was also a situation where the 
predicted number of private cars was less than the actual 
number. This was because the Policy was implemented 
on December 23, 2010, and the policy information was 
leaked in advance. In order to avoid the difficulties in 
registration, residents bring forward their consumption 
schedule. In the consumption plan of 2010, the sales 
volume in 2010 was affected by the upcoming policy, 
and the future consumption of the automobile market was 
overdrawn in 2010, so that the actual number is greater 
than the predicted number.
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Figure 1
The Actual and Predict Number of Private Passenger Cars in Beijing 1989-2016.
From the above analysis, the vehicle quantity 
regulation can greatly control the growth of the number 
of passenger cars and reduce the pressure on road traffic. 
However, according to actual research, there are not only 
Beijing-brand vehicles but also out-of-town licensed 
vehicles on the roads in Beijing. This is also different from 
Singapore. That is to say, as a city-type island country, 
Singapore’s regulated area is the whole country, and the 
overall domestic vehicle can be indirectly controlled by 
the quantity control. However, in China, taking Beijing 
as an example, after implementing the vehicle quantity 
regulation policy in Beijing, many Beijing citizens went 
to other provinces and cities, such as Tianjin and Hebei, 
to apply for other cities’ licenses. This causes the vehicles 
on the road to not be reduced due to the control of the 
Beijing brand. At the same time, the relevant government 
has increased the cost of regulation, which requires 
additional policies to restrict the movement of out-of-town 
licensed vehicles in Beijing. Loss of efficiency in quantity 
regulation.
1.3  The Traffic Congestion Governance Effect
The mechanism of traffic congestion is very simple. When 
the road traffic density exceeds the road capacity in a 
certain period of time, the entry of the marginal vehicle 
occupies the road driving space, which reduces the 
driving speed of the vehicle on the original road, thereby 
increasing the time it takes for all vehicles to pass the 
section of the road.  Considering time spending on road as 
cost, the increasing of time mentioned above can equal to 
the increase of private marginal cost and synchronously 
the marginal cost of society increasing. Of course, the 
social marginal cost is greater than the private marginal 
cost. We use the road supply and demand model shown in 
Figure 2 below to analyze the mechanism of the quantity 
regulation policy. Here, the horizontal axis represents the 
traffic density, indicating the degree of traffic congestion, 
and the vertical axis represents the cost benefit. MSC is 
the social marginal cost under certain road traffic, MPC 
is the private marginal cost under certain road traffic, 
and the D curve represents the marginal benefit curve of 
residents under certain road traffic, that is, the demand 
curve for traffic density. The state of the area to the right 
of point A indicates the state of traffic congestion, and 
the more congestion to the right. As can be seen from 
the figure2, point A is the Pareto equilibrium point of the 
whole road, point B is the private marginal cost equal to 
the private marginal benefit curve, and the right side of 
point B indicates that if the marginal vehicle continues 
to enter the road, it will cause serious congestion, giving 
Private brings negative effects.
Now assume that the state of a congested section is 
point B. Except for the vehicle quantity regulation , no 
measures are taken. To reduce congestion, it is necessary 
to reduce the traffic density and move point B to the 
left. According to the above analysis, under the quantity 
control, our national vehicle licenses will increase at 
a steady rate, but actually road traffic density is not 
controlled by this policy. Because the road resources 
is limited, the number of vehicles carried on the entire 
road will only increase with the growing car quantity, 
and the points in the figure will not be moved to the left. 
However, on the other hand, they will also not move to 
the right quickly, because the total amount of vehicles is 
controlled. The number of vehicles on the road will just be 
less than the total number of vehicles. That is, the degree 
of congestion will not continue to increase. Therefore, in 
theory, civil vehicle control can keep traffic congestion 
steady without rapid deterioration, but the effect of 
reducing traffic congestion needs further study.
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Figure 2
Road Resource Supply and Demand Curve
The above analysis can be verified from the traffic 
condition of Beijing where the quantity regulation policy has 
implemented. This paper mainly uses the vehicles speed in 
road network to measure traffic congestion effect in Beijing.
Figure 3
Average Speed of Morning and Evening Peaks of Beijing’s Main Road From 2002 to 2016
Source: Beijing Transportation Development Research Center Traffic Development Annual Report
It can be seen from Figure 3 that the average allowable 
speed value of main road in Beijing urban area has been 
decreasing year by year from 46km/h in 2002, and it 
has been around 20km/h from 2006 to 2016. After the 
implementation of the vehicle quantity regulation in 2010, 
the speed has rebounded slightly, but it is still around 
20km/h, indicating that the policy can stabalizae the 
degree of traffic congestion and prevent traffic congestion 
from continuing to deteriorate, but it cannot reduce the 
congestion.
All of the above is an analysis of a certain section of 
one road. As far as the entire city is concerned, not all 
road sections will be congested. From the perspective of 
space, there are often traffic jams in the busy sections of 
the main city, commercial centers, etc., often showing the 
urban-rural dual structure. On the other hand, the peak 
hours of commuting are the most serious period of traffic 
congestion. The quantity regulation is only a macro-
control of the total amount. It is impossible to control the 
number of vehicles passing through the congested road, 
nor can it regulate the distribution of vehicles during the 
peak hours of commuting.
2.  ANALYSIS OF THE WELFARE EFFECT 
OF THE QUANTITY REGULATION OF 
PASSENGER CARS
Based on the above-mentioned road supply and 
demand model, this paper analyzes the welfare effect 
of the quantity regulation of small passenger cars, and 
theoretically analyzes the existence of welfare losses 
in existing policy and the actual situation of policy 
implementation to cause the loss of welfare. According to 
the analysis of the second part, the quantity regulation can 
not make the equilibrium point B move to the left. At this 
time, the welfare loss caused by the congestion cannot 
be reduced, that is, the area of the triangle DBE does not 
change. However, the implementation of the control of 
the number of passenger cars will increase the cost of 
the entire society, and the marginal social cost curve will 
move up. At this time, the social equilibrium point moves 
from E to D’’. Then the social welfare loss increases, and 
the added portion is the area of D’’D’DE. The main causes 
of this additional social welfare loss include the following 
four aspects.
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Figure 4
Road Supply and Demand Model
First, the policy generates additional car purchase 
costs. The quantity regulation policy encourages a large 
number of consumers to buy cars and registerate in some 
other countries, such as going to Hebei, which requires 
more, extra energy, time and capital costs. This also breeds 
the illegal trading market for license plates. In order to 
meet the demand for self-driving travel, many unqualified 
customers purchase or rent a license plate registration 
qualification under the name of others to achieve the 
purpose of purchasing a car. Not only does the purchase 
transaction cost increase, but vehicle ownership cannot be 
obtained. What is more serious is that if a traffic accident 
or other rights and responsibilities accident occurs, both 
the user and the vehicle registrant will face different 
degrees of risk. For example, the vehicle ownership 
registrant will have an economic dispute liability accident, 
the vehicle is likely to be seized and auctioned.
The second is to increase the cost of government 
regulation. The management cost of regulating cars from 
other provinces has increased. Beijing has a policy of 
restricting cars from other provinces in the city center. The 
quantity regulation in Beijing prompt residents to buy cars 
from other countries, this directly increase the number of 
out-of-town vehicles in Beijing. The traffic management 
department needs to invest more manpower and material 
resources to manage the vehicles from other provinces. 
In particular, some citizens also take risk in the restricted 
time period. Sometimes, in order to avoid management, 
traffic accidents are prone to occur. Then, there are 
a large number of illegal and counterfeit behaviors, 
which increases the difficulty and cost of monitoring by 
government.
The third is the loss of consumer surplus. Restricting 
consumer purchasing rights will cause social welfare 
losses. First of all, consumers always have the demand for 
car purchases, because the current punctuality rate, speed, 
frequency of departure, route coverage, and convenience 
of public transportation have not reached the level of 
replacing passenger cars. So the public transportation 
cannot meet consumers’ travel requirement. There must 
be a demand for car purchase. Therefore, the small 
passenger car quantity regulation policy will bring about 
three aspects of social welfare losses: (a) The decline of 
travel experience and quota allocation directly deprive 
consumers’ right to purchase, which will inevitably result 
in loss of consumer surplus. (b) The loss of other life 
experience utility. Since the right to purchase is deprived, 
in the case of quota allocation, the quota is distributed 
randomly. In order to avoid the risk of no car in a long 
time, the car purchase plan is bring forward. Consumers 
need to spend a certain amount energy, time, and money 
to participate in the lottery. And their investment in other 
life activity would be reduced. This increases consumer 
surplus losses. (c) The waste of social resources. In 
order to increase the probability of winning, usually all 
members of the entire family will participate in the lottery, 
which leads to a decline in the success rate and also 
caused resource losses.
The fourth is to generate rent-seeking costs and 
corruption. Many citizens have been unable to obtain 
registeration qualification for a long time, or they are 
unwilling to spend time and effort on a small probability 
event. It is very likely that they will seek the internal 
staff of the policy introduction department in order to 
obtain license plates through internal operations. This 
will inevitably lead to government officials accepting 
bribes and conducting unfair violations. The time, money, 
manpower and material resources spent during this period 
must be a big cost behind the policy.
CONCLUSION
From the above analysis, the implementation of the 
vehicle quantity regulation can indeed alleviate the 
deterioration of traffic congestion, and can promote the 
upgrading of the automobile industry, change the concept 
of people’s travel, and stimulate the rapid construction of 
public transportation, but it still cannot be ignored that 
there are series of negative effects and additional social 
welfare losses. But why do most cities still choose the 
vehicle quantity regulation policy? We have found that 
the selection of small passenger car volume regulation 
policies in some cities in China has its specific subjective 
and objective conditions. Subjectively, the government 
departments hope to control the number of small 
passenger cars quickly and accurately, so as to avoid 
a significant increase in the difficulty of future traffic 
management. Objectively speaking, it is the current urban 
planning and development. The government still lacks 
new traffic management plan with high innovation and 
high intelligence, and the cost is too high, including much 
the manpower and material resources. If we consider the 
effect of price regulation, we will find that there will be 
more welfare losses in price regulation. Under the existing 
resource endowments in Beijing, price regulation will 
also bring welfare losses, which needs to combine the 
economic status of Beijing and China. Further in-depth 
comparative analysis.
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From the perspective of public choice theory, the 
government will take into account the interests of the 
government, individuals and related interest groups in 
the process of intervening in the growth of the number of 
passenger cars in Beijing. Relatively speaking, the vehicle 
quantity regulation is currently a sub-optimal choices. 
What is most needed at present is to optimize the rule 
“interim regulation of small passenger cars quantity”, 
and to shift the simple restrictions to deregulation. The 
government should adjust policies according to economic, 
political, cultural and other dynamic variation of sociedty 
and then introduce corresponding supporting policies. 
Based on international experience, actual conditions and 
our research, this paper proposes the following policy 
recommendations.
(a) Optimize the application conditions for consumers. 
In order to balance the car consumers and car-free 
consumers, and to improve the existing congestion 
situation, the qualification requirements should change. 
For families with more than two cars, one of them can 
directly obtain the update index, and the rest which 
need to be updated should obtained by lottery. Or the 
government can set duration for all license plates like 
Singapore and consumers will need to application again at 
the end of qualification.
(b)The tradable mechanism of license plate or passage 
right. As a policy to control traffic congestion, it should 
be able to solve the problem at present and foresee the 
problems then governance those problems advance. What 
needs to be managed now is to reduce congestion on the 
road in the center of the city and avoid the “tragedy of the 
commons”. Therefore, it is feasible to separate the right of 
passage from the license plate for regulation. For example, 
the limit line itself is also a kind management of the 
right of passage. The right of passage can be divided into 
different types, combined with the traffic capacity of each 
area, and distributed according to a certain amount for 
the travellers of different needs. Under the premise of one 
person one car or one household one car, the government 
could allow legal trade of the original stock license and 
the new license of the lottery. Then eliminate distortion of 
registeration allocation.
(c)Alleviate the city’s pressure and establish a 
multi-core integrated commercial body. At present, the 
Beijing Municipal Government has gradually moved the 
administrative center to the east, but correspondingly, it 
is necessary to develop a multi-core commercial center to 
evacuate the commercial functions of the city instead of 
transferring congestion from one place to another.
(d )  Improve  in t e rc i ty  t r a ff i c ,  u rban  pub l i c 
transportation and sharing economy. Public transportation 
is a shared transportation resource provided by the 
government. It needs to be combined with urban planning 
to achieve seamless conversion between various public 
transportation (intra-city rail transit, inter-city rail 
transit, buses, public bicycles). It also need to provide 
vehicle parking lot around transportation junction in the 
commercial center to facilitate self-driving travellers to 
change travel modes. Another solution is to open a special 
bus-only passage on the main road; increase the number 
of bus trips in the central business district; and reduce the 
transit time between the central business districts through 
planning. It is important to make public transportation 
gradually become the best choice for commuters. So it is 
necessary to accelerate the construction of inter-city public 
transportation, and reduce the pressure from the out-of-
town cars. In order to improve the utilization rate of each 
passenger car, it is efficient to advocate sharing travel. At 
the same time, we should strengthen the supervision of 
network car service system to enhance the safety of the 
network car, and then promote the consumption of shared 
vehicles by consumers.
(e) Gradually establish the intelligent transportation 
system. In order to manage the right of passage in the 
future, such as collecting road congestion fees, parking 
fees, etc which need to be supported by high intelligence 
systems. Labor is not only costly but inefficient. And the 
intelligent transportation system can provide real-time 
traffic information for the travellers, which is convenient 
for drivers to adapt to local conditions and flexibly 
adapt to changes in traffic conditions. Therefore, the 
development of intelligent transportation is not only the 
trend, but also the key point of city development.
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